In this paper, we investigate time-consistent equilibrium feedback strategies for a dynamic mean-variance problem of investing in a risky financial market over a random time horizon under both discrete-time and continuous-time frameworks. The random maturity of the investment is assumed to be a general distribution independent of the underlying asset processes. By applying stochastic control theory, we derive the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations for both discrete-time and continuous-time frameworks. We explicitly obtain equilibrium feedback strategies in some cases, and we find that the equilibrium feedback strategies over a geometrically or exponentially distributed random horizon might be nonunique. Moreover, we prove that the equilibrium feedback strategy with zero riskless interest rate is identical to the equilibrium feedback strategy for a finite, fixed time horizon. This implies that, if the time horizon is random, the equilibrium feedback strategy loses the status of optimality among time-consistent strategies. We believe this occurs because the players at each point in time are non-cooperative local optimizers.
It is well-known that the dynamic asset allocation problem under the mean-variance criterion faces the difficulty of time inconsistency, in the sense that the classical dynamic programming approach can not be applied directly due to the failure of the iterated-expectations property. There are mainly two approaches to provide solutions to time-inconsistent problems. The first approach is to solve for the pre-commitment strategy, that is, the decision maker is only concerned about today's optimality-optimality at a later time is not relevant-and the decision maker commits to continuing with this strategy. One problem with this approach is that the optimal decision made today might not be optimal tomorow. Li and Ng [14] and Zhou and Li [24] embedded the original mean-variance problem into a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem. They extended Markowitz's work to a multi-period model and to a continuous-time model. Motivated by the need of more realistic models, Zhou and Yin [25] considered the mean-variance portfolio selection with regime switching. Lim and Zhou [16] solved a mean-variance problem with random market parameters in a complete market. Along this line, Lim [15] studied the quadratic hedging and mean-variance portfolio selection in an incomplete market. We can also refer to Dai et al. [10] and references therein for the recent developments in pre-commitment strategies for meanvariance portfolio selection problems. Although pre-commitment strategies have theoretical value and might be economically meaningful in certain circumstances (Kydland and Prescott [13] ), the issue of time-inconsistency is still not addressed.
The second approach, starting with the seminal work of Strotz [20] , is to formulate a noncooperative game and look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Specifically, at every time point, the decision maker treats all future "versions" of herself as separate players and finds a strategy that she knows all future versions will follow, given that the remaining future versions will also follow the given strategy. In this sense, the equilibrium feedback strategies are thus time-consistent. This game theoretic approach for time-inconsistent problems has been extended in many directions by researchers; see, for example, Basak and Chabakauri [3] , Björk and Murgoci [4] , Czichowsk [9] , and Björk et al. [5] . The ways to define the equilibrium strategy, or more specifically the local spike variation, are not unique. Hu et al. ([11] and [12] ) defined equilibrium via open-loop controls instead of feedback controls. 1 They characterize the perfect Nash equilibria using a Pontryagin-type stochastic maximum principle and derive a general sufficient condition for equilibria through a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations.
In the above mentioned papers about dynamic asset allocation under the mean-variance criterion, the time horizon is assumed to be a fixed constant. Also, most of classical financial economics is based on the assumption that investors know with certainty the time of eventual exit. But, in practice, most investors would acknowledge the fact that, when they enter the market, they are uncertain about the length of their investment horizon. Investors might be forced to abandon their original investment plans because of some unexpected events. Factors that can potentially affect the time of exit are, for example, the behavior of financial markets, changes in the opportunity set, uncertainty of order execution time, changes in an investor's endowment, time of an exogenous shock to an investor's consumption process, and so on. Including uncertain exit times in financial decision making goes back to Yaari [22] , who considered an optimal life insurance, investment, and consumption problem. Furthermore, Merton [19] studied a continuous-time optimal investment and consumption problem with a random exit time. Blanchet-Scalliet et al. [6] extended Merton [19] , which allowed the conditional distribution function of an investor's time-horizon to be stochastic and correlated to returns on risky securities. Recently, some researchers also pay their attention to mean-variance portfolio selection with uncertain time horizon, but only under pre-commitment strategies. Wu and Li [21] investigated a multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection with regime switching and uncertain exit time. Yu [23] examined the continuous-time mean-variance optimal portfolio selection problem with random market parameters and random time horizon. Based on Yu [23] , Lv et al. [17] extended the model to an incomplete market. Again, the aforementioned works on mean-variance criterion with random horizon assume pre-commitment to the strategies.
It is of both theoretical and practical interest to study the time-consistent equilibrium feedback strategy for the dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection over a random time horizon, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work on it. In this paper, we define an equilibrium feedback strategy for a dynamic mean-variance, investment problem with random time horizon in both multi-period and continuous-time models. The investor is allowed to invest in a financial market consisting of a stock and a risk-free asset, and the random maturity of the investment is described by a general distribution. By applying stochastic control theory, we establish the corresponding extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations. We derive explicit equilibrium feedback strategies in some special cases.
Our main findings are two limitations of equilibrium feedback strategies. (1) equilibrium feedback strategies over a geometrically or exponentially distributed random horizon might be non-unique. (2) In both multi-period and continuous-time frameworks, the equilibrium feedback strategy with zero riskless interest rate is identical to the equilibrium feedback strategy with a fixed finite horizon. This implies that the equilibrium feedback strategies are not optimal among time-consistent strategies. One way to explain such insensitivity of equilibrium feedback strategies facing a random horizon is that players at each time point are non-cooperative local optimizers in the sense that they only have local control of the strategy and they don't collaborate with each other. Although this feature is well-known from the definition of equilibrium feedback strategies, we find its negative consequence when the terminal time is random.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the discrete-time model for the equilibrium feedback strategy of the mean variance problem over a random horizon. Section 3 is parallel to Section 2 but with a continuous-time model. The proofs for the verification theorem and the derivation of equilibrium feedback strategies are postponed to Appendix A.
2 Discrete-time model
Problem formulation
On a discrete time set I = {0, 1, . . . , T }, consider a financial market consisting of a stock with price process {S n } n∈I and a riskless bank account with value process {B n } n∈I . The dynamics of S and B are given, respectively, by
in which {Y n } n=1,...,T are independent and identically distributed random returns of the stock, and the interest rate r ≥ 0 is constant. Let µ = E[Y n ] and σ 2 = Var(Y n ) denote the common expectation and variance of the random returns of the stock.
Given a trading strategy u = {u n } n∈I − , in which u n denotes the dollar amount invested in the stock at time n, the dynamics of the corresponding portfolio value {X u n } n∈I is given by
Let Z n = Y n − r, and R = 1 + r; then, we have
. We restrict the controls to feedback controls, that is, u n (x) : {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} × R → R is measurable.
Since we aim to study the mean-variance problem over a random horizon, without loss of generality, let τ be the random maturity, independent of {Y n } n=1,...,T , taking values in {1, . . . , T }.
Define the following (conditional) probabilities:
Our objective is to maximize the mean-variance value function defined by
where we write E n,
However, due to time inconsistency induced by the variance term, we cannot do that directly. Instead, we define an equilibrium feedback strategy for the mean-variance problem over a random horizon as follows.
Definition 2.1 For fixed (n, x, u) ∈ I − × R × R and a trading strategy u = { u k } k=n,...,T −1 , conditional on τ > n, define a strategy u u,n = {u
Then, u is called an equilibrium feedback strategy if for every fixed (n, x) ∈ I − × R,
If an equilibrium feedback strategy u exists, then define the corresponding equilibrium value function by V n (x) = J n (x, u).
equilibrium feedback strategy
In addition to the value function J n (x, u), we define the auxiliary function g n by
We first derive recursive formulas for J n and g n . The proof is postponed to Appendix A.
with the boundary condition at time T − 1 given by
We then present our main result for the discrete-time model. The proof is again postponed to Appendix A.
Theorem 2.1 An equilibrium feedback strategy for (2.2) is given by, for n ∈ I − ,
where
The corresponding value functions are given by, for n ∈ I − ,
where the coefficients A n , B n , C n , b n , c n are determined recursively by
with boundary conditions
Next, we consider some special cases of this general result for the discrete-time model. In the following corollary, we consider the case with zero interest rate. The equilibrium feedback strategy (and the corresponding value function) is derived by a tedious backward induction, hence is omitted.
Corollary 2.1 When r = 0, an equilibrium feedback strategy is given by
Remark 2.1 It is very interesting to see that the equilibrium feedback strategy when r = 0 reduces to a constant strategy, which is actually identical to the equilibrium feedback strategy for a fixed time horizon, that is, τ = T almost surely; see Proposition 9.1 of Björk and Murgoci [4] . One way to explain the insensitivity of the equilibrium feedback strategy under a random maturity is that the players at each time are local non-cooperative optimizers. It is easier to understand the problem if one considers backward induction. Indeed, the time T − 1 player, will adopt the same strategy as if facing fixed maturity because τ = T |(τ > T − 1) almost surely. Using a backward induction argument, one can show that the other players, from time T − 2 to time 0, will then be forced to follow the same constant strategy as the time T − 1 player.
As a negative consequence of non-cooperation, the equilibrium feedback strategy u loses the status of optimality among time-consistent strategies.
Example 2.1 Suppose that r = 0, and τ takes values in {1, 2} with probability P(τ = 1) = q and
, for n = 0, 1.
It is straightforward to check that
.
On the other hand, for the equilibrium feedback strategy u in Corollary 2.1, the corresponding value function is
Moreover, one can show that
which demonstrates that the equilibrium feedback strategy u is not optimal among time-consistent strategies.
By a similar argument used to prove Theorem 2.1, we can solve the discrete-time, mean-variance problem for the geometric distribution, although τ is an unbounded random variable. Suppose that the probability mass function of τ is given by 6) in which q = 1 − p ∈ (0, 1). Thanks to the memoryless property of the geometric distribution, the problem becomes time-independent. We define
Corollary 2.2 Suppose that τ follows a geometric distribution with probability mass function given in (2.6). An equilibrium feedback strategy for the discrete-time, mean-variance problem is given by
The corresponding value function is given by
with the expected value of the portfolio given by
in which the coefficients A, B, C, b, and c are determined by the following system of equations,
Due to the complexity of the above system of equations, it is difficult to explicitly solve (A, B, C, b, c). However, because the system is nonlinear, it is very likely to admit multiple solutions. The non-uniqueness of equilibrium feedback strategies can be see more clearly in the continuous-time framework; see later Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.1. Moreover, when the interest rate r = 0, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that r = 0 and τ follows a geometric distribution with probability mass function given in (2.6). Then
is the only constant equilibrium feedback strategy for the discrete-time, mean-variance problem.
Proof. For any c ∈ R, consider a strategy u = {u n } n=0,1,... given by
With some calculation, one can show that
Clearly the optimal u 0 to maximize J(x, u) is given by
Therefore, by Definition 2.1, a constant strategy u n = c for all n = 0, 1, . . . is an equilibrium feedback strategy if and only if c = µ γσ 2 .
Note that the strategy in Proposition 2.2 is identical to the strategy in Corollary 2.1. If we wished to maximize J(x, u) over all constant strategies u, then the optimal (pre-committed) constant amount to invest would be
, n = 0, 1, . . . .
But, at any point in time, the player believes the future selves would have no incentive to follow that strategy. Instead, acting selfishly, she would invest the amount given in (2.8).
3 Continuous-time model
Problem formulation
Let Ω, F, F = {F t } t≥0 , P be a filtered, complete probability space satisfying the usual conditions. Suppose that the financial market consists of a riskless bond with constant interest rate r ≥ 0, and a stock whose price process {S t } t≥0 follows a geometric Brownian motion, that is,
in which µ > r, σ > 0, and {B t } t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. Given a trading strategy u = {u t } t≥0 , in which u t denotes the dollar amounted invested in the stock at time t ≥ 0, the corresponding wealth process X u = {X u t } t≥0 follows the dynamics
where µ = µ − r. The set of admissible feedback trading strategies is defined by
Let τ be a random maturity that is F-measurable and is independent of the Brownian motion {B t } t≥0 . Moreover, we first assume τ is a continuous random variable bounded by T > 0, that is,
The hazard rate function of τ is denoted by λ :
To obtain explicit expressions for the equilibrium feedback strategies, later in this section, we will choose τ to be an independent exponential time, which simplifies the problem to time homogeneous.
Our objective is still to maximize the mean-variance value function
We first define the equilibrium feedback strategy over a random horizon, in which we follow the definition proposed by Björk and Murgoci [4] for a fixed horizon.
in which u, y ∈ R. Suppose that
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R, then u is called an equilibrium feedback strategy, and the corresponding equilibrium value function V is given by
equilibrium feedback strategy
We first provide a verification theorem that includes the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) system of equations that the equilibrium feedback strategy and value function solve. The proof of the verification theorem is postponed to Appendix A. For u ∈ R, define the differential operator
and second-order continuously differentiable in x ∈ R. 
For any
Let u = u t (x) denote the optimal value that attains the supremum in (3.3).
3. For any x ∈ R, V (T, x) = x and g(T, x) = x.
Then, u = { u t (x)} t,x∈[0,T ]×R is an equilibrium feedback strategy such that
To obtain explicit results, in the rest of this section, we choose τ be an independent exponentiallydistributed random variable with mean 1/λ. Thanks to the memoryless property of the exponential, any equilibrium feedback strategy will be time independent. Also, we can obtain (at least one) equilibrium feedback strategy explicitly, along with the corresponding functions V and g.
Theorem 3.2 An equilibrium feedback strategy for the mean-variance problem over an exponentiallydistributed random horizon with mean 1/λ is given by
4)
in which (z 1 , z 0 ) solves the system of equations consider the time nodes I = {0, ε, 2ε, . . .} with p = e −λε . The portfolio value changes according to
in which {Y t } t∈I still denotes the random stock return in each period. Let Z t = Y t − rε for t ∈ I and R = 1 + rε, we have
For ease of notation, let µε = E[Z t ], σ 2 ε = Var(Z t ), and E[Z 2 t ] = σ 2 ε + µ 2 ε 2 . One can show that as ε ↓ 0, the system of equations in (2.7) reduces to the system given in (A.16) in Appendix A. It further implies that the equilibrium feedback strategy in Corollary 2.2 converges to the equilibrium feedback strategy (3.4) .
The next corollary shows that the equilibrium feedback strategy given in Theorem 3.2 is decreasing with respect to the portfolio value. This is not totally surprising because this behavior is consistent with the pre-commitment strategies of either a finite horizon mean-variance problem (Zhou and Yin [25] ) or a random-horizon mean-variance problem (Lv et al. [17] ).
Corollary 3.1 If r > 0, then the solution z 1 of (3.5) is negative.
Proof. From the first equation of (3.5), define the function
Differentiate h twice to obtain
Note that h(0) = 2r 2 m > 0, h (0) = (λ − r) 2 + 4rm > 0, and h (0) = 2(2r − λ + 2m).
If 2r − λ + 2m ≥ 0, we deduce that h (z) ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0. It follows that h (z) > 0 for all z ≥ 0. Thus, h only has negative zeroes.
If 2r − λ + 2m < 0, or equivalently, 0 < r + 2m < λ − r, it is straightforward to show that
which implies that h has no zeroes. Thus, h (z) > 0 for all z ≥ 0, and h has only negative zeros. Proof. When r = 0, the system (3.5) reduces to
We deduce from the first equation of (3.7) that
It remains to show that z 1 = 0 is the only possible solution because it immediately implies, from the second equation of (3.7), that Substitute these expressions into z 2 1 + (2m − λ)z 1 + λ 2 = 0 to obtain
The only solutions of the above two equations are
However, the second candidate z 1 = −2m is not a valid solution because it implies λ = 
Remark 3.2
The equilibrium feedback investment strategy in (3.6) is identical to the one in Bjork et al. [5] for the finite-time horizon problem when r = 0; see Proposition 3.1 there. Note that it is also identical to the equilibrium feedback strategy in Corollary 2.1 under the discrete-time framework with a geometrically-distributed random horizon. As we discussed in Remark 2.1, we believe this is due to the non-cooperative and local-optimizing feature of equilibrium feedback strategies.
As in the discrete-time framework, the equilibrium feedback strategy u = µ γσ 2 is not the optimal one among all time-consistent strategies, as we demonstrate in the following example. . From (3.1) and the assumption that τ follows an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ, it is straightforward to show that the corresponding value function is given by
On the other hand, we can show that the value function for the equilibrium feedback strategy u = µ γσ 2 is given by
Moreover, we have
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We have
Note that
from which it follows that
It follows that
On the other hand,
The recursion for g can be derived in the same way. Indeed, from (A.2) and (A.1), one obtains
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Recall the strategy u u,n defined in (2.3). We have that
By taking the supremum with respect to u on both sides of the recursion of J n in (2.4), we obtain
(A.5)
Consider the ansatz
Substituting (A.6) into (A.5) yields the equilibrium feedback strategy
in which
For ease of notation, from (2.1) and (A.7), let
Then, we can rewrite the recursions in (A.5) as
and
By matching the coefficients in the above three equations, we obtain the recursions for A n , B n , C n , b n and c n .
Finally, we prove the boundary condition (2.5) . Note that τ = T |(τ > T − 1) almost surely; thus,
It follows that the equilibrium feedback strategy
which implies G T = 0 and H T = µ γσ 2 . Since the corresponding value function is
we have
This ends the proof.
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let u be the maximizer to attain the supremum in (3.3) and suppose (1)- (3) in Theorem 3.1. For any admissible strategy u, define a sequence of stopping times τ u n = inf t ≥ 0 :
Take expectation to the above equation and invoke condition (2) to obtain
Let n ↑ ∞ and k ↑ T ; becuase P(τ > T ) = exp − T 0 λ(s)ds = 0, it follows that
Next, we show V (t, x) = J(t, x, u). By condition (2), we first rewrite (3.3) as
By applying Itô's formula to exp
and using (A.9), we obtain
Let n ↑ ∞ and k ↑ T ; because P(τ > T ) = exp − T 0 λ(s)ds = 0, it follows that
Note that, similar to (A.8), we have
By substituting (A.11) into (A.10), we obtain
It remains to show that the maximizer u in (3.3) gives an equilibrium feedback strategy.
Consider the strategy u ε defined in (3.2) 
Note that For any φ ∈ C 1,2 ([0, T ] × R), Itô's formula implies E t,x φ(t + ε, X u t+ε ) = φ(t, x) + εL u φ(t, x) + o(ε), thus, we can further rewrite (A.12) as J u ε (t, x, u ε ) = (1 − λ(t)ε) V (t, x) + εL u V (t, x) − γ 2 g 2 (t, x) − γ 2 εL u g 2 (t, x) + ελ(t)h(x) + γ 2 (1 − 2ελ(t)) g 2 (t, x) + εγxλ(t)g(t, x) + o(ε)
It follows from condition (1) that lim inf ε↓0 V (t, x) − J(t, x, u ε ) ε = lim inf ε↓0 J(t, x, u) − J(t, x, u ε ) ε ≥ 0.
Therefore u is an equilibrium feedback strategy. , to obtain the system of equations in (3.5).
